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NOTES AND COMMENTS
WHY NOT ADVISORY OPINIONS FOR ILLINOIS?
The submission of a proposed revision of the Judicial Article of the
state constitution,' offered to the Illinois General Assembly at its current
session, raises the serious question as to whether or not the proposal is not
incomplete by reason of the failure to include therein a provision calling
for the rendition of advisory opinions by the Illinois Supreme Court to
the governor and to the legislature on proper request. As it is essential
that the new article should, in every respect, be complete before it is sub-
mitted to the electorate for ratification, an examination has been made
concerning the utility of, as well as of the constitutional and legalistic
bases for, advisory opinions to the end that, if they could be said to be of
value, the proposed revision might be suitably amended prior to its ap-
proval by the legislature.
One scarcely should need to repeat the story of American experience
under the ill-fated National Industrial Recovery Act 2 in order to invoke a
recognition of the fact that the whole fiasco could have been avoided had
the federal supreme court been empowered, or required, to first express
an opinion on the constitutionality thereof before it was imposed upon a
helpless public. The economic waste, not to mention the upheaval, the
country suffered by reason of its efforts to comply with that statute, prior
to the time it was declared unconstitutional, 3 are matters of common knowl-
edge. The dilemma of one whose previous lawful conduct faces the con-
demnation of a new penal statute, not sure whether to act and pay the
penalty if the law turns out to be valid or to forego his legal rights until
the question of its constitutionality can be determined at the suit of others,
is amply illustrated by the holding in such cases as that of Ex parte
Yoang.4 To come closer to home, local experience with attempts to secure
a pre-adjudication as to the validity of Illinois tax levies5 should serve to
demonstrate the urgent need for securing advice in advance as to the
constitutional appropriateness of legislation of substantial import to the
1 The text of the proposed revision appears in Zacharias, "The Proposed Illinois
Judicial Article," 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 303-38 (1952), particularly pp.
303-13.
248 Stat. at L. 196; 15 U. S. C. § 703.
3 Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
4209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932 (1908).
5 Barnett v. County of Cook,. 388 Ill. 251, 57 N. E. (2d) 873 (1944), declaring
Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 1103, unconstitutional. See also the earlier cases of Griffin v.
County of Cook, 369 Ill. 380, 16 N. E. (2d) 906, 118 A. L. R. 1157 (1938), Invalidat-
ing Laws 1937, p. 1019, and Barnett v. County of Cook, 373 Ill. 516, 26 N. E. (2d)
862 (1940), declaring Laws 1939, p. 848, unconstitutional.
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general public." There should, then, be little need to belabor the point
that the present system of government is inadequate so long as it permits
one branch thereof to enact laws without a decent regard for the fact
that another branch may be compelled to declare those acts to be invalid.7
Despite this, both in England and the United States, the history of the
advisory opinion has been one of pointed criticism, with every new attempt
to provide for it bringing up the ghosts of past criticisms as well as some
newer objections.' Regardless of how history may have fashioned the ad-
visory opinion, there can be no doubt, from the fact of the inclusion of a
provision on the point in seven state constitutions, 9 that there is need on
the part of the executive and legislative departments for constitutional
advice from the judiciary. It would be well, therefore, to examine into
the basis thereof.
The English practice of calling upon the judges for their opinions
was firmly established by the time of McNaghten's Case'° for both the
Crown and the House of Lords had exercised their right of appeal to
the judiciary for advice before this. In fact, as history attests, it was
the Crown's abuse of the practice which induced Coke's criticism thereof
in Peacham's Case" and in Elliot's Case.1 2 Manifestly, English precedent
on this subject advances no compelling reason, either pro or con, for the
adoption of the practice in this country, particularly because of a basic
difference between the English system of government and that found in
the United States. The doctrine of separation of governmental powers,
stressed here, being unknown to the English system, the English judges
6 While compulsory rendition of advisory opinions has never been provided for In
Illinois, either by constitutional provision or by statute, it is interesting to note
that the Illinois Supreme Court once stated that it would not be averse to render-
ing such opinions: People ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229 (1857), particularly
p. 234.
7 See Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (The Macmillan Co., New York, 1951), Vol. 2,
p. 746, for an account of a message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to a
congressional committee requesting that it approve a measure which he had
sponsored rather than to "permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable,
to block the suggested legislation." The measure, afterwards enacted, was declared
unconstitutional in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed.
1160 (1936).
8 The most recent statutory attempt to provide for an advisory opinion would
appear to be Vt. Laws 1949, No. 51. The supreme court of that state promptly
disavowed any duty to perform such a function: In re Opinion of the Justices,
115 Vt. 524, 64 A. (2d) 169 (1949). An earlier Vermont statute, enacted in 1864,
had been repealed by Vt. Laws 1915, No. 84.
9 See Colo. Const. 1876, Art. VI, § 3, as amended in 1886; Fla. Const. 1868, Art.
VI, § 16, substantially repeated in Fla. Const. 1885, Art. IV, § 13; Me. Const. 1819,
Art. V1, § 3; Mass. Const. 1780, Part 2, Ch. III, Art. 2; N. H. Const. 1902, Part 2,
Art. 74; R. I. Const. 1843, Art. XII, § 2 as amended in 1903; So. Dak. Const. 1889,
Art. V, § 13.
10 10 C1. and Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
11 Cro. Car. 125, 79 Eng. Rep. 711 (1614).
12 Cro. Car. 181 and 605, 79 Eng. Rep. 759 and 1121 (1629).
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at one time sat with the House of Lords as temporal assistants,'3 and
the executive was also considered as being a member of that body. 14 It
may be interesting to note, however, that while the English judiciary
ultimately established its independence, 15 it waged a fruitless battle against
the advisory opinion for the practice is still alive and in use at the present
time.
It might have been expected that the English practice of rendering
advisory opinions would traverse the ocean and find roots among the
colonial governments, 16 and would be likely to appear in the early consti-
tutions adopted shortly after the Revolution. The concept particularly
manifested itself in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, in which con-
stitution the principle is still operative. 17 In fact, the influence of the
English practice on the Massachusetts provision is apparent. The clause,
as first reported to the convention, limited interrogation to the governor
and the upper house, equivalent to the Crown and the House of Lords
in the English practice, and it was only by an amendment added on the
convention floor that the privilege was extended to the house of representa-
tives.18 The New Hampshire provision appears to have been borrowed from
Massachusetts, for the text of its 1784 constitution 9 followed that of
Massachusetts except for some essential changes in terminology.20 Maine
next adopted the advisory opinion in the constitution it drafted in 1820
at the time of its separation from Massachusetts. The consultative power
was, however, there made somewhat larger than that which prevailed in
Massachusetts. 21 Rhode Island, by its constitution of 1842, followed the
13 Coke, Institutes (W. Clarke & Sons, London, 1817), Vol. 4, Part 4.
14 Cooley, Const. Lim., Vol. 1, p. 99, note 1.
15 Hare, Constitutional Law (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1889), Vol. 1, p. 159.
16 Ellingwood, Departmental Cooperation in State Government (Macmillan Co.,
New York, 1918), pp. 30 et seq.
17 Mass. Const. 1780, Part 2, Ch. III, Art. 2, provides: "Each branch of the
legislature, as well as the governor and council, shall have authority to require the
opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important questions of
law, and upon solemn occasions."
18 Ellingwood, op. cit., pp. 31-2.
19 See Thorpe, American Charters, Vol. 4, p. 2466.
20 The clause was repeated in the N. H. Const. 1792, Art. 74, except that the word
"governor" was substituted for "president." See Thorpe, American Charters, Vol. 4,
p. 2486. The wording remained unchanged when the present constitution was
adopted. N. H. Const. 1902, Part 2, Art. 74, states: "Each branch of the legislature
as well as the governor and council shall have authority to require the opinions of
the justices of the superior court upon important questions of law and upon solemn
occasions."
21 Me. Const. 1819, Art. VI, § 3, in part provides: "They shall be obliged to give
their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, when
required by tile Governor, Council, Senate, or House of Representatives." The
Massachusetts provision gave the power of interrogation to "each branch of the
legislature, as well as the governor and council." The Maine provision, authorizing
requests from the "Governor, Council, Senate, or House of Representatives," elimi-
nated the problem which had arisen in Massachusetts over whether the governor
might alone request advice or whether he had to do so jointly with the council.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
example of its neighbors, again with somewhat more liberality for, there
being no council created by the new constitution, the consultative power
rested with the governor or either house of the general assembly; the "im-
portant question and solemn occasion" qualification was omitted; and the
judges were bound to give their opinion upon "any question of law." 22
Missouri was the first of the western states to constitutionally provide
for an advisory opinion, 23 but the qualification that the opinion should be
on "important questions of constitutional law" was severely construed
as limiting the scope of the advice and the general construction placed
upon the provision by the judges24 fore-shadowed its doom by confinement.
Death blows were dealt to the provision in the course of some subsequent
opinions 25 and the drafters of the Missouri Constitution of 1875 must
have considered the corpse well buried, for they omitted any reference
to it in that constitution. Constitutional provision for an advisory opinion
next appeared in Florida,26 in 1868, perhaps because conditions during
the Reconstruction Era necessitated co-operation between the executive
and the judiciary to curtail the actions of what promised to be an incom-
petent and an untrustworthy legislature. This may have accounted for
the fact that the consultative power was there limited to the executive
but it is, in other respects, quite broad, permitting requests "at any time,"
and as to "the interpretation of any portion of this constitution, or upon
any point of law."
The adoption of an advisory opinion clause by the State of Colorado,
27
22 R. I. Const. 1843, Art. XII. § 2, as amended in 1903, reads: "The judges of the
supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law whenever
requested by the governor or by either house of the general assembly."
23 In Mo. Const. 1865. Art. VI, § 11, there appeared the statement that the "judges
of the supreme court shall give their opinion upon important questions of constitu-
tional law, and upon solemn occasions, when required by the governor, the senate,
or the house of representatives; and all such opinions shall be published in con-
nection with the reported decisions of said court."
24 See Advisory Constitutional Opinion of the Judges, 37 Mo. 135 (1865).
2 The various opinions rendered under the Missouri provision are comprehen-
sively analyzed in Ellingwood. op. cit., pp. 43-6.
26 Fla. Const. 1868, Art. VI. § 16, stated: "The governor may at any time require
the opinion of the justices of the supreme court as to the interpretation of any por-
tion of this constitution, or upon any point of law, and the supreme court shall
render such opinion in writing." In the 1885 Constitution, Art. IV, § 13, the Florida
governor was permitted to, at any time, "require the opinion of the Justices of the
Supreme Court as to the interpretation of any portion of the Constitution upon
any question affecting his Executive powers and duties. and the Justices shall
render such opinion in writing."
27 Colo. Const. 1876, Art. VI. § 3,. as amended in 1886, declares: "The supreme
court shall give its opinion upon important questions upon solemn occasions when
required by the governor, the senate, or the house of representatives; and all such
opinions shall be published in connection with the reported decisions of said court."
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under an amendment promulgated in 1886, was undoubtedly intended to
correct the problem of unconstitutional legislation which then plagued the
state.2 8 It is important to note, however, that it is the "Supreme Court"
of that state, and not the justices thereof, which is required to give the
opinion. Why this choice of words was employed is not easy to discern,
but the presence thereof gave rise to a problem as to whether or not, con-
trary to all precedent, the opinions were to have the force and effect of
judicial decisions, 29 rather than being merely advisory in character. While
the court ultimately decided in favor of the latter construction,30 it even
today considers the question as a whole body, rendering the opinion per
curiam. The last state to deal with the point by constitutional provision
was South Dakota where the section appeared in the original constitu-
tion.8 l As in Florida, the consultative power is there limited to the gov-
ernor but, unlike Florida, the question need not be one of constitutional
significance but can be on "important questions of law."
In the absence of any constitutional requirement, advisory opinions
were, at least in earlier days, rendered by courts in nine states3 2 with only
one court expressly disavowing the duty to render such opinions.
33
Statutory provisions sought to establish a practice for advisory opinions
28 See Ellingwood, op. cit., pp. 48-55.
29 In the Matter of the Constitutionality of S. B. No. 65, 12 Colo. 466, 21 P. 478
(1889).
-0 In re Fire and Excise Commissioners, 19 Colo. 482, 36 P. 234 (1894).
31 So. Dak. Const. 1889, Art. V, § 13, provides: "The governor shall have authority
to require the opinions of the judges of the supreme court upon important questions
of law involved in the exercise of his executive powers and upon solemn occasions."
32 Opinion of the Judges of the Supreme Court, 30 Conn. 591 (1862) ; Opinion of
the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 79 Ky. 621 (1881) ; In the Matter of the
Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78 (1865); In re Railroad Commissioners. 15
Neb. 679, 50 N. W. 276 (1883); People v. Green, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 614 (1845):
Opinion of the Justices, 31 N. C. (9 Ire.) 361 (1849) : State v. Johnson, 21 Okla. 40,
96 P. 26 (1908) : Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 Dall. 111 (1784) ; Opinion of the
Judges of the Supreme Court, 37 Vt. 665 (1864). The practice in Nebraska was
evidently discontinued by court rule: 52 Neb. xviii, Rule 32. For the later view in
Vermont, see note 8, ante.
33 State v. Baughman. 38 Ohio St. 455 (1882). After their earlier experiment, the
courts of Connecticut. Nebraska and New York appear to have denied their power,
or duty, to render advisory opinions: Reply of the Judges of the Supreme Court
to the General Assembly, 33 Conn. 586 (1867) : In re Board of Purchase and
Supplies for State Institutions, 37 Neb. 425, 55 N. E. 1092 (1893) ; In re Workmen's
Compensation Fund, 224 N. Y. 13, 119 N. E. 1027 (1918). It was thought, in 1870,
that North Carolina had taken a similar stand: Opinions of the Justices of the
Supreme Court in Regard to the Term of Office of the General Assembly, 64 N. C.
785 (1870). Subsequent thereto, however, the supreme court of that state cheerfully
acquiesced in giving advice: Resolution of request and summary of McLean and
Murphy Bills, 204 N. C. 806, 172 S. E. 474 (1933) ; Advisory Opinion in re House
Bill No. 65, 227 N. C. 708, 43 S. E. (2d) 73 (1947). See also Edsall, "The Advisory
Opinion in North Carolina," 27 N. C. L. Rev. 297 (1949).
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in Delaware,34 Minnesota,3 5 and Vermont,36 but the Minnesota act never
became operative, the Vermont statute was repealed,37 and the Delaware
provision appears to have been seldom relied on.38 It might be said, there-
fore, that out of the list of other states where advisory opinions have
been rendered, North Carolina stands alone as the only state where such
opinions are being actively rendered.3 9 Mention should be made, however,
of the fact that one of the most recent statutes purporting to require the
rendition of advisory opinions is the one passed in Alabama in 1923 and
amended some four years later.4 0 The statute would appear to have been
drawn with the hope of avoiding some of the objections heretofore voiced
to the practice of rendering advisory opinions. It provides for the sub-
mission of briefs on those questions which are propounded, 41 affords pro-
tection to those acting pursuant to the advice given, 42 and, while con-
fined to advice on constitutional questions, makes the advice available both
as to proposed- legislation and as to laws already enacted.
43
The fate of the advisory opinion at the hands of the federal judiciary
3427 Del. Laws Ch. 4 (1852), as amended In 1893, states: "The Chancellor and
Judges, whenever the Governor shall require it for public information, or to enable
him to discharge the duties of his office with fidelity, shall give him their opinions
in writing touching the proper construction of any provision in the Constitution of
the State or of the United States, or the constitutionality of any law enacted by
the Legislature of this State." See Del. Rev. Code 1935, § 374. The statute remained
unrepealed as late as 1951.
35 Minn. Comp. Stat., Ch. 4, § 15.
36 Vt. Laws 1864, No. 70.
37 See Vt. Laws 1915, No. 84. See also note 8, ante.
38 The only noted instance of an advisory opinion rendered by the court of that
state appears in In re School Code of 1919, 30 Del. 406, 108 A. 39 (1919).
39 See note 33, ante.
40 Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 13, §§ 34-6. Section 34, originally enacted in 1923, provides:
"The governor by a request in writing, or either house of the legislature, by a reso-
lution of such house, may obtain written opinion of the justices of the supreme
court of Alabama, or a majority thereof, on important constitutional questions."
41 Ibid., § 36, states: "The justices of the supreme court may request briefs from
the attorney general, and may require briefs from other attorneys as amici curiae,
as to such questions as may be propounded to them for their answers."
42 Ibid., § 35, added in 1927, declares: "The opinion of the justices of the supreme
court or a majority of them shall be a protection to the officers and departments
of the state, acting in accordance therewith, in the same manner and to the same
extent as opinions of the attorney general of the state, and in the event of a
conflict between the opinions of the attorney general and the opinions of the justices
of the supreme court rendered in accordance with this article, the opinion of the
justices of the supreme court shall take precedence and prevail. All opinions of the
justices of the supreme court heretofore rendered in accordance with this article
shall have the protective force and effect provided for herein."
43 From the beginning, the Alabama Supreme Court has evidently entertained no
doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute itself for it has rendered advisory
opinions without any evidence of reluctance: In re Opinions of the Justices. 209




appears to have been dependent more on circumstance than on deliberative
reasoning. The advantage of such a provision must have been clear to
those who sat in the constitutional convention of 1787, for at least one
such provision was debated there44 although Charles Pinckney's pro-
posal for an advisory opinion clause substantially similar to that adopted
in Massachusetts proved to be unsuccessful. 45  It would appear that an
omnipresent fear of a controlled judiciary, or the possibility of an al-
liance between the executive and the judicial departments against the
legislature, was more responsible for the defeat than any consistency of
principle.
Unfortunately, the first time the federal supreme court might have
acted to render an advisory opinion, the question propounded was
purely political in nature, was extremely comprehensive, and was pre-
sented in formidable shape.46 Under these circumstances, the court was
afforded an excellent opportunity to refuse to answer and it did do so.
47
It may be of some interest to note that, on May 4, 1822, President Monroe
vetoed a bill seeking to extend federal power over turnpikes within state
boundaries. He embodied his views on the point in a pamphlet and sent
a copy to each justice of the United States Supreme Court. Marshall re-
plied expressing agreement but Story merely acknowledged his receipt
thereof. Thereafter, Justice Johnson obtained the views of his associates
and, with their consent, forwarded a joint opinion to Monroe.48  If this
could be considered in the nature of an advisory opinion, there can be no
doubt that the Supreme Court did thereafter refuse, and has ever since
refused, to render opinions which would be no more than advisory in
nature.
49
Manifestly, the attitude taken by the federal supreme court demon-
strates what amounts to the generally prevailing view in the United States,
one which deems that, in the absence of a constitutional provision authoriz-
ing it, a requirement for the rendition of an advisory opinion by a court
44 Ellingwood, op. cit., pp. 56-7.
45 Ibid., p. 57.
46 Jefferson, Collected Writings, Vol. IV, p. 22.
47 See note in 5 Ford. L. Rev. 94, especially pp. 101-2. Details giving rise to the
interrogation are set out in Marshall, Life of Washington, Vol. V, Chaps. 1-2.
48 Bizzell, Judicial Interpretation of Political Theory (G. P. Putnam's Sons. New
York, 1914), p. 115 et seq.
49 While the cases in point were not requests for advisory opinions in the com-
monly accepted sense of the term, the court dismissed cases for failure to satisfy
the jurisdictional criterion of interested parties asserting adverse rights, where
any other determination would be more in the nature of an advisory opinion. See
Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339. 12 S. Ct. 400, 36 L. Ed.
176 (1892); In re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222, 13 S. Ct. 577, 37 L. Ed. 429 (1893);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1911).
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would violate the principle of separation of governmental powers.50 How-
ever, the truth of this is open to serious doubt. Surely, the advising of
the executive or the legislature is not a function peculiar to either of
those bodies. It is, rather, a function which has traditionally been judicial
in nature, even though it may fall in the shadow zone which is said to lie
between the several governmental powers. Of course, aside from abstract
categorical analysis, the only logical objection to the rendering of such
opinions is that to do so would subject the judiciary to a function im-
pinging upon their independence. This, however, overlooks the essential
nature of the advisory opinion. The duty is usually imposed on the justices
individually, rather than upon the court.51 The opinions, when rendered,
do not become precedent, for neither res judicat, nor stare decisis is appli-
cable.52 If the merit of an opinion should accord it weight, this merely
attests to the quality thereof and its efficacy as preventive justice; but that
fact by no means determines that it is more than persuasive in nature.
Notwithstanding these observations, it is recommended that the function
should be more positively imposed on the court by a constitutional pro-
vision rather than by a simple legislative enactment.
53
In practice the utility of the advisory opinion has been severely cir-
cumscribed by some doubtful interpretations given to clauses authorizing
such opinions.54 It has, for example, been held that a question from the
legislature can be answered only if it relates to pending legislation,5
with an accompanying qualification which would exclude inquiry as to a
bill not yet definite in form5 6 or one which has already become law by
reason of its final passage. It has been held that the question must relate
to public as opposed to private rights, 57 and must be one possessing
50 Although the federal constitution does not expressly provide that the several
departments of government should be separate, the doctrine is now well established
in federal law. Nearly every state, however, has expressly provided that the depart-
ments of the state government should be separate, distinct, and not subject to
encroachment upon by the other departments. See, for example, Ill. Const. 1870,
Art. HI.
51 See, for example, the Colorado provision set out in note 27, ante, and the cases
mentioned in notes 29 and 30, ante. See also People v. Martin, 19 Colo. 565, 36 P.
543 (1894).
52 Adams v. Bucklin, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 125 (1829). See also Ellingwood, op. cit.,
pp. 223-37.
53 In re Opinion of the Justices, 115 Vt. 524, 64 A. (2d) 169 (1949).
54 Ellingwood, op. cit., p. 178 et seq., lists thirteen separate considerations bearing
upon the rendering of advisory opinions with a comprehensive analysis of each.
55 In re Opinion of the Justices, 217 Mass. 607, 105 N. E. 440 (1914) ; In re S. R.
No. 4, 54 Colo. 262, 130 P. 333 (1913).
56 In re Opinion of the Justices, 226 'Mass. 607, 115 N. E. 921 (1917). The justifi-
cation for this view would seem to be that an action for declaratory judgment
would be a more appropriate remedy in these instances.
57 In re H. B. No. 99, 26 Colo. 140, 56 P. 181 (1899). This qualification obviously
includes all questions relating to litigation then pending in the courts: Common-
wealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. 530 (1810) ; In re Continuing Appropriations, 18 Colo. 192,
32 P. 272 (1893).
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peculiar importance."" Obviously, the question must be confined to mat-
ters of law for fact questions will not be considered.59 In Florida and
South Dakota, where the interrogatories may come only from the execu-
tive, 60 the questions cannot relate to legislative doubts,6 so the justices
are not bound to advise the executive on a measure before it becomes law.62
In addition, under the Florida provision, which is more restrictive than
the rest, the duty to advise is limited to constitutional construction of the
powers and duties of the executive branch.63 It has also been said that
the opinion, when rendered, is neither binding on the interrogating body
4
nor on other govenrnmental bodies. 65 On the other hand, requested opin-
ions will not be refused simply because of the possibility that the question
submitted may be the subject of future litigation;66 because the subject
is not one of judicial nature ;67 because the court is lacking in legal
assistance ;68 or because immediate legislative or executive action is not
contemplated.6 9
The most startling development in the advisory opinion question has
been in relation to the interpretation of the phrases "important question"
and "solemn occasion" frequently found in constitutional or statutory
provisions."0 Rather than construe the words to denominate the inter-
rogating body as the arbiter of what should constitute an important
question or a solemn occasion, the courts have unequivocally stated that
they are to be the sole judges on these points.71  In certain instances,
58 In re Interrogatories of the Senate, 54 Colo. 166, 129 P. 811 (1913).
59 Opinion of the Justices, 120 Mass. 600 (1876) ; In re Opinion of the Justices,
76 N. H. 601, 81 A. 170 (1911).
60 See the text of the Florida and South Dakota constitutional provisions set forth
in notes 26 and 31, ante.
61 In re Construction of Constitution, 3 S. Dak. 548, 54 N. W. 650 (1893).
62 In re Executive Communication Concerning Powers of Legislature, 23 Fla. 297,
6 So. 9-5 (1887).
63 In re Opinion of the Justices, 69 Fla. 632, 68 So. 851 (1915).
64 Ellingwood, op. cit., pp. 153-60.
65 In that regard, note the provisions of the Alabama statute set out In notes 40
to 42, ante.
66 This is true only as a general statement: Ellingwood, op. cit., pp. 181-205.
The author cites cases containing qualifications on the rule.
67 Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557 (1878) ; Opinion of the Court, 60 N. H.
585 (1881).
68 In the Matter of the Constitutionality of S. B. No. 65, 12 Colo. 466, 21 P. 478
(1889): In re Bounties to Veterans, 186 Mass. 603, 72 N. E. 95 (1904).
69 If the question is not one of immediate concern, it must be one which the
inquiring body could have occasion to consider in the exercise of the powers
entrusted to it: In re Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 208
Mass. 614, 95 N. E. 927 (1911). In Colorado, questions from the legislature must
relate to pending bills: In re S. R. Relating to Internal Improvement Fund Provided
for by Act of Congress, 12 Colo. 285, 21 P. 483 (1889).
70 See particularly the provisions of the constitutions of Colorado, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire and South Dakota set out above. See also the Alabama
statute quoted in notes 40-2, ante.
71 Opinions of the Justices, 95 Me. 564. 51 A. 224 (1901) : Opinion of the Justices,
122 Mass. 600 (1877) ; Functions of Judiciary, 148 Mass. 623, 21 N. E. 439 (1889).
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they have declared that the two qualifications must concur 7 2 and may
have used these phrases as a door by which to escape from odious or
difficult questions. 73 It is difficult to find any logical basis for this assump-
tion by the courts of the right to pass upon these qualifications, but there
can be no doubt that, precedent having been established, such precedent
has been unvaryingly followed thereafter. Supposedly, the result has
been dictated by an application of the principle of separation of powers,
as based upon the imputed intent of the framers of the several constitu-
tions, 74 but this is, at best, no more than a weak rationale.
To reiterate, the attack upon the advisory opinion has been bottomed
on the principle of separation of governmental powers. Yet, it has been
admitted that that principle is one not capable of accurate delineation as
between the several functions of government and there has always been
recognition of a considerable degree of overlapping. For that matter, it
has never been seriously contended that each department should be un-
willing to assist the others in serving the public for whose benefit govern-
ments have been established. The manifest purpose of the advisory opin-
ion, then, is to obviate those difficulties which can arise among the several
departments and thereby to lend to the operations of the government at
least some semblance of efficiency, a quality most conspicuously absent
in our present system. The attack upon the advisory opinion falters and
lags perceptibly in the face of the drain which may be put on the public
treasury by the presence of unconstitutional legislation or in the face of
the effect such laws may have upon the people during the period of their
usurpatious existence. If for no other reason than to prevent the havoc
which can be created by the presence of such spurious laws, there is
ample justification for the use of the advisory opinion.
Traditional conservatism on the part of the judiciary 75 should not be
allowed to override the practical demands of a working government. True,
the judiciary has played an invaluable role as the dominant constraining
influence upon rash and ill-conceived movements which gnaw at the
vitals of sound and stable government. It could, however, play an even
more effective role if it would warn against such movements at the start.
There would, then, appear to be full reason why the General Assembly
should, as it considers the proposal to revamp the present Judicial Article,
also consider the need for complete as well as proper revision.
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